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ABSTRACT
Scientific and technical analyses are at the heart of many
environmental disputes. There are three ways mediators can
use scientific and technical expertise to assist disputants
in reaching an "informed" consensus. First, mediators can
help disputants use experts to understand how the natural or
technical system central to the dispute functions. Second,
mediators can use experts to help disputants understand how
alternative agreements are likely to affect them. Third,
mediators can help disputants understand the reasons why the
experts disagree. In each situation, the mediator's role is
to facilitate communication either among experts or, between
experts and less technically-skilled disputants.
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INTRODUCTION
Growing attention is focusing on the field of dispute
resolution. One important subset of this field is
mediation. I am interested in the ways in which mediation
can be used to help disputants move from competitive
relationships (in which they narrowly define their
interests) to joint problem solving. My particular focus is
on environmental mediation, situations in which decisions
must be based, at least in part, on scientific and technical
judgements.
Others have explored the characteristics of science-
intensive environmental policy disputes (Bacow & Wheeler;
Ozawa & Susskind; Bingham). This thesis is an extension of
their work. It focuses on the roles scientific expertise
plays in environmental mediation, particularly on the ways
in which mediators facilitate communication among experts
and less technically-skilled negotiators.
Effective mediation presumably leads to consensus
(Fisher & Ury; Goldberg, Green & Sanders). Consensus occurs
when all the disputants can "live with" a proposed
resolution of their differences (Susskind & McMahon). This,
in turn, occurs when all parties involved in a dispute
believe that their most important concerns will be met
(Raiffa). In the strictest sense, consensus occurs when
disputants sign an agreement.
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Scientific and technical experts can become part of an
mediated process under several scenarios. The experts may
be working for the disputants in what I will refer to as
scenario A. In scenario B, the experts may be independent
of the disputants but, associated with the mediator.
Lastly, the experts may not be associated with either the
disputants or the mediator and join the process because they
are interested in the issue. This last situation will be
referred to as scenario C. As I introduce each hypothesis,
I will indicate under which of the scenarios the hypothesis
is more likely to be relevant. The hypotheses apply equally
to situations in which there is a genuine debate about
technical issues and when technical issues are being put
forth to mask non technical concerns.
HYPOTHESES
I believe there are three ways environmental mediators
can use scientific and technical expertise to assist
disputants in reaching an "informed" consensus. First,
mediators can help disputants use scientific experts to
understand the function of the natural or technical system
central to the dispute. Negotiating parties are more likely
to reach an informed consensus when they have this basic
knowledge. For instance, without an understanding of the
ways in which ecological systems work, disputants are not
likely to invent solutions that will have the outcomes they
expect. Comprehension is critical to the long-term
stability of any commitments contained in an agreement. The
experts explaining the system are typically associated with
4
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THESIS STRUCTURE
Chapter I begins with a brief review of the
traditional framework for scientific inquiry and explains
the tension between the scientists' and the policy makers'
use of and need for technical information. The sources of
experts' disagreements set the stage for my three
hypotheses.
Each of the hypotheses is then explained in a
separate chapter. Most of the illustrations and examples
present are drawn from secondary sources, although some
(noted in the text) build on my first-hand experiences as
practitioner.
This thesis is written primarily for environmental
mediators. As such, I conclude by summarizing my specific
I
a
suggestions to assist environmental mediators use scientific
expertise. The advice, however, should also be useful to
any individual likely to participate in mediated
environmental disputes.
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CHAPTER I
USING SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION IN POLICY
DISPUTES
Scientific and technical choices are at the heart of
most environmental disputes (Bacow & Wheeler). Policy
makers at the federal, state and local level must rely on
scientific analyses in making "informed" policy, to justify
their policy choices to the public, and to satisfy legal
prohibitions against "arbitrary and capricious" (Nelkin &
Pollak; Brooks). Yet, the ethos of scientific inquiry is
often inconsistent with the needs of policy makers.
Scientific experts are trained to pursue hypotheses
through experimentation and debate among their peers until
they achieve an acceptable level of certainty (Kalberer,Jr.,
Haun). Policy makers, in contrast, often must select a
solution without either sufficient analysis or debate.
THE NATURE OF SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY
The ethos of scientific inquiry requires systematic
experimentation and peer review. J. Williams Haun describes
the scientific method as a five step process:
1. Form a hypothesis.
2. Experiment to test the hypothesis.
3. Document the experiment.
4. Replicate the experiment.
5. Confirm or reject hypothesis (Haun, p.47).
This sequence allows experts to discover how, for example,
an ecological system functions. Then, using the traditional
peer review approach experts, in open meetings question each
others' experimental findings and conclusions. The result,
presumably, is an agreement on the validity of the findings
and the inferences drawn.
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Today, refereed journals are the forum in which such
peer reviews generally occur (Kalberer, Jr.) Articles
submitted for publication are reviewed (anonymously) by
respected referees who judge the submitted work on the
quality of the experimentation and the conclusions.
Ultimately, the conventional wisdom is challenged, reframed,
and challenged again. At any point in time, the experts may
converge around a prevailing view (Kalberer, Jr.).
There are, however, limitations to this method that
restrict pursuing truth. First, scientists by nature of
their training tend to focus on existing ideas and theories,
rather than offering new formulations. Thomas Kuhn, a
scholar of scientific history believes normal science aims
to refine, extend, and articulate paradigms in existence
(Kuhn). Other commentators suggest that it may not be in
the expert's interest to put forth ideas that contradict the
prevailing view. Experts may find it advantageous to "go
along" with those in positions of authority (Kuhn).
Like most of us, scientists require extremely
persuasive evidence to reject the status quo. Doing so,
however, means admitting that we might have been in error
before. Young experts may find this particularly difficult
because they must often defend their hypotheses in debates
with individuals who helped train them (Kuhn). It may thus
be hard for both the junior and the senior scholars to deal
with challenges to the conventional wisdom.
An additional complication is the high cost of
research equipment which frequently compels scientists to
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rely on government, corporate and foundation funding. Many
funding sources are prone to support scientists pursuing
ideas that extend but, do not reject the dominant theories
(Haun). If an expert advocates a radical view, he or she
may risk loosing funding (Haun). Thus, experts are often
confined by their training, their relationships with other
analysts, and their sources of funding to build upon but,
not to challenge the accepted theories. This reality, to an
extent, flys in the face of the pure scientific method which
seeks to accurately describe how our environment behaves.
THE NEED FOR SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS IN POLICY DISPUTES
Agencies charged with protecting public health and
environmental quality, like the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) and the Occupational Health Safety
Administration (OSHA), review scientific and technical
studies as part of the process of generating policies to
satisfy legislative mandates. Experts, be they "in-house"
or outside consultants, provide analysis but, do not make
the policy decisions. The policy makers who weigh the
scientific advice are ultimately responsible for policy
decisions.
The EPA must, for example, make the government's
policy on acid rain. The analyses considered in preparing
this policy range from studying the cause-effect
relationship between midwestern fossil fuel plants'
emissions and acid deposition in New England lakes, to
estimates of the effects that mining low sulfur coal would
have on a state with active high sulfur mines. Though
9
numerous environmental groups believe scientists now know
enough to justify a decision limiting sulfur dioxide
emissions from fossil fuel plants, EPA staff and President
Reagan still contend that we do not understand enough about
the nature of long range transport of pollutants to take
action. While the Agency contracts for, and conducts
studies to gather and to analyze the most current data, it
still retains control over the policy decision.
Given the highly politicized nature of many
environmental disputes, policy makers need credible
scientific analyses to back up their decisions. Declining
distrust in decision-making authority and expertise is one
motivating factor that leads citizens to question reasons
for decisions affecting their health and safety (Nelkin &
Pollak).
In 1976 residents and city officials in Cambridge,
Massachusetts, for example, were concerned about the
possible public health risks from recombinant DNA research
at Harvard University. In response to great anxiety over
possible accidents and mistrust of the guarantees submitted
by Harvard University and federal government health experts,
the Mayor created a citizen's review board to assess the
safety and monitoring procedures outlined by the National
Institutes of Health (NIH). Board members included a
former mayor, a nurse, a community activist, a university
professor of urban policy, a former city councillor, a
physician, and a social worker. Board members heard
seventy-five hours of testimony from experts associated with
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Harvard, NIH, and other institutions; read articles; and
visited laboratories before reaching a decision. Though
the Board began its hearings assuming that the research
should be precluded, by the end of six months of wading
through reams of analyses, provided by the experts, they all
agreed research should continue. In its decision, the Board
accepted the NIH guidelines which outlined the types of
substances that could be used, responsible testing
procedures, and emergency responses. The Board however,
specified additional monitoring procedures including broader
public participation on university biohazard committees
(Nelkin, 1978).
In this case, the Mayor and citizens of Cambridge did
not trust the evidence offered by Harvard experts to show
that their procedures would be safe. The public thus
demanded, and got greater access to the decision making
process. They learned for themselves exactly what would be
involved in testing recombinant DNA and reached a decision
regulating the testing which they could live with.
According to Harvey Brooks, the public at-large is
more likely to be persuaded by arguments employing
statistics because these statements will be perceived as
more "scientific " than less tangible strategic and
political arguments (Brooks). Nuclear power proponents
appear to subscribe to this view. The nuclear industry made
a strategic choice in the 1970's to shift the nuclear power
debate from a question of ideologies to a technical debate
about the estimated engineering risks associated with plant
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operations (Starr). Industry officials believed statistics
demonstrating that nuclear plants would be as safe as
activities like, driving your car would convince citizens to
accept these power plants (Schwing & Albers; Starr; Lindrell
& Earl; Slovic, Fischoff & Lichtenstein). Presumably a
portion of the population was swayed by these statistics.
Lastly, agencies complete scientific and technical
analyses to fend off court challenges. Regulations and
standards must be based on a plausible body of evidence or
argument so as not to be deemed "arbitrary and capricious"
(Brooks). Defensible standards must be based on a rationale
analysis supporting the final regulatory decision. In 1983,
the OSHA benzene standard was overturned as being "arbitrary
and capricious" because OSHA could not cite sufficient
technical analyses justifying workplace exposure standards
(Nyhart & Carrow).
The need for scientific expertise is clear. Policy
makers want to make informed decisions. In most cases that
requires conducting technical studies. Within the past
decade however, the public has come to mistrust technically-
intensive policy decisions (Nelkin & Pollak). To overcome
their fears, citizens demand access to the policy making
processes and the studies decision makers are likely to use
to support their actions (Nelkin & Pollak). In reviewing
complex environmental disputes, however, the lay public is
more easily swayed by statistics than ideological arguments
(Brooks). The appeal of numbers to citizens combined with
the agencies' desires to produce legally defensible
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regulatory decisions leads policy makers to request
scientific analyses (Nyhart & Carrow).
SOURCES OF DISAGREEMENT AMONG EXPERTS
As I described above, policy makers in technically-
intensive disputes rely on experts' analyses. However, in
many cases while the policy makers are seeking a consensus
expert view, they receive a wide range of conflicting
opinions (Brooks; Ozawa & Susskind). Frequently no expert
consensus exists to conclusively lead policy makers to a
particular decision or, show citizens that the policy choice
is either unequivocally right or misguided.
Drawing on a recent categorization of the sources of
scientific disagreement presented by Connie Ozawa and
Lawrence Suaskind. I will discuss four categories of
disagreement: 1) rhetorical presentations 2) differences in
the design of inquiry, 3) errors in the analysis, and 4)
conflicting interpretations of similar analyses
(Ozawa/Susskind).
Rhetorical Presentations
Experts representing opposing interest groups are
likely to disagree and muster rhetorical devices or present
information in different forms to bolster their arguments.
Rhetorical presentations may occur both when experts are
representing their interests or when technical issues are
being used to prolong a conflict. Alan Mazur describes how
experts participating in debates over fluoridation and
nuclear power used rhetorical devices to support their
positions (Mazur). Both issues focused on questions of
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harmful effects, if any, from long-term exposure to low
doses of fluorine and radiation (Mazur).
In the fluoridation debate, experts attempted to
discredit the opposing view with statements like "no
evidence has ever been produced that 1.0 part per million of
fluoride in drinking water has or, will harm any living
person or thing." This type of all inclusive denial of the
opposing experts' view also occurred during the nuclear
power debate "no evidence exists for such an effect (i.e.
differential harm depending on the rate of radiation
delivery) on cancer or leukemia induction by radiation in
man" (Mazur, p.238). By using the phrase "no evidence" the
experts obscured questions on the true impacts of either
fluoride or nuclear power. In these cases," no evidence"
did not indicate that the substance was not harmful, but
rather that no investigator tried to document the impacts
(Mazur). The impacts may exist. Regardless of the actual
effects, interpretations of the crucial "no evidence" phrase
could clearly sway public opinion in favor of a technology
or substance that might be harmful if investigated (Mazur).
In other cases, experts trying to bolster their cause
may present the same facts in different formats. Harvey
Brooks describes the debate over the effects of nuclear
fallout that preceded the atmospheric test ban treaty of
1963. Experts supporting testing estimated health damages
in terms of the increased chances of cancer for each
individual exposed to the fallout. The increases, expressed
in a fraction, were extremely small. Critics of the testing
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conversely, expressed the same information in terms of extra
deaths occurring worldwide in fifty years. These figures
were extremely high, especially when compared to the other
fatalities occurring randomly in life (Brooks, p.39).
Differences in The Design of Inquiry
Differences in the design of inquiries may also lead
experts to disagree. Though "scientific inquiry" is a
rigorous technique to test hypotheses, inescapable
subjective choices influence the results. Researchers must
frame their hypothesis, specify their assumptions, select
their data base, and describe their impact area. Each such
"value" choice affects the results of the analysis (Brooks;
Ozawa & Susakind). In other words, the experts own values
shape their analyses (Nelkin 1978).
Consider the affect of framing the hypothesis. Using
the same data base two researchers evaluating the impacts
posed by a hazardous waste treatment facility could arrive
at vastly different conclusions. One researcher
representing community groups may frame the question to
select a site that minimizes impacts to the community while,
a second researcher may ask which site affords the greatest
economic gain for waste generators. The second analyst may
be motivated by her background in economics or, like her
colleague, be conducting the analysis on behalf of a client
with a narrow interest.
Specifying different assumptions can also cause
experts to disagree. Alan Mazur description of the dispute
over expected deaths from the Atomic Energy Commission's
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(AEC's) nuclear power programs is a good example. Two
groups of scientists' estimates of the likely cancers per
year varied by three orders of magnitude. Yet both sets of
scientists used the same methodology. Each multiplied the
risk, by the dose per year, by the number of individuals
exposed. The source of the discrepancy can be traced to the
different estimates of dose per year (Mazur). One expert
assumed that the value was based on the permissible level of
exposure, while the second expert based his/her value on the
actual average exposure to the population. Since the actual
exposure level is smaller than the permissible level, it
explains the different estimates of cancers per year (Mazur,
p. 250).
Selecting a data base can lead scientists addressing
the same question to reach contradictory conclusions.
During the fluoride controversy, scientists frequently
dismissed as invalid data that did not support their
hypotheses (Mazur, p.255).
Errors in Analysis
Errors in the analysis may also lead experts to
conflicting conclusions. During the Agent Orange debate, a
study suggesting that the chemical might create
malformations and tumors caused considerable controversy.
But further examination of the study revealed an erroneous
analysis. Yet, the work sparked heated debate among
interest groups representing affected interests (Wessel,
p.49).
Conflicting Conclusions
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Finally, even if scientists share the same ideology,
agree on the design of the inquiry, and do not make errors
in their analysis, they may interpret the results
differently thus, reaching conflicting conclusions (Mazur,
p.255-256). Consider recent attempts to regulate
carcinogens. Existing experiments test the effects of
possible carcinogenic substances on animals. Some
scientists infer from these experiments that a substance
causing tumors in animals can be extrapolated to show a
similar causal link in humans (Nyhart & Carrow, p.71)
Others reject the validity of extrapolating from animal
experiments to humans and, thus, do not endorse the policy
implications supported by the first group of scientists
(McGarity).
Ozawa and Suaskind describe a situation in which two
geologists are asked to review historical seismic activity
data to forecast the likelihood of an earthquake. The
existence of a geological fault line in a seismically
inactive area with but no perceptible tremors in 40,000
years, could be the basis of two interpretations. One
geologist might feel the data suggests that a future
earthquake is highly unlikely, while a colleague may
conclude the fault line forebodes an earthquake (Ozawa &
Suaskind, p. 14).
DEALING WITH DISAGREEMENTS
Given the many reasons experts are likely to disagree,
it is not surprising that environmental policy makers can
become frustrated (Nelkin). The various sources of expert
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disagreement spelled out here indicate the numerous reasons
why experts will present conflicting conclusions to policy
makers.
In environmental policy disputes, mediators can play a
key role in helping policy makers and other stakeholders use
scientific expertise to reach consensus.
A dispute over the siting of a proposed resource
recovery facility illustrates that even when disagreement
among experts and uncertainty over technical information
persists, a mediator can help disputants produce
constructive strategies that will guide future policy
choices. In this case the mediator worked with experts both
associated with the disputants (scenario A) and independent
experts (scenario C).
Brooklyn, New York Resource Recovery Dispute
Siting a resource recovery facility at the Brooklyn,
New York Navy Yard involved a controversy over smokestack
emissions. At the center of the dispute was the New York
City's Board of Estimates (BOE) decision regarding
constructing and operating a resource recovery plant at the
Brooklyn Navy Yard. The BOE is responsible for approving a
plan to handle the City's 20,000 ton per day solid waste
stream (Konkel).
The New York Academy of Sciences convened a policy
dialogue to help resolve the disagreement over the public
health impacts from plant operations (Block). The Academy
selected Lawrence Susskind, Professor at the Urban Studies
Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology to
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facilitate the dialogue. His responsibilities at the
meeting included moderating discussion and questions;
maintaining a visual record of key points, particularly
points of scientific agreement and disagreement; and
outlining a future research agenda to resolve the remaining
scientific questions (Ozawa & Susakind). The 65 dialogue
participants included: a panel of five experts not
personally associated with the controversy, representatives
from city agencies, interested citizens, organizations and
scientists associated with the disputants (Academy).
The dialogue helped all participants to recognize that
the experts had different levels of confidence their
descriptions of how dioxins and furans are formed and in
their forecasts about how these emissions would effect human
health (Ozawa & Susakind). Discussing the experts' views
helped the parties understand why two risk assessments, one
prepared for the City's Department of Sanitation and a
second, prepared for a local citizens group reported such
radically different conclusions (Ozawa & Susskind; Konkel).
The City's report, completed by Fred C. Hart and Associates,
Inc., estimated that six additional cases of cancer could be
expected for every million people exposed to plant
smokestack emissions over a 70 year lifetime (Konkel). The
Hart researchers judged this risk to be acceptable. The
Barry Commoner report, prepared on behalf of local citizens,
in contrast, estimated an additional 1430 cancers per
million people exposed to plant emissions, creating an
unacceptable public health risk (Konkel).
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The mediator helped disputants trace the source of the
different reports' conclusions by focusing the dialogue on
the reports' assumptions (Konkel). The participants
(experts and lay persons) realized that what they originally
perceived as a theoretical disagreement about how dioxins
are formed and transported, clearly emerged as a difference
in the prescribed design of the risk assessment studies
(Ozawa & Susakind). The Hart consultants estimated the
likely public health impacts from only one plant.
Commoner's analysis was based on likely emissions from a
series of plants. Commoner asserted if the City approved
one plant it would create a precedent to approve the
additional plants. His study therefore, evaluated the
impacts from a series of resource recovery facilities'
emissions (Ozawa & Susskind).
The mediator also asked the experts to explain their
assumptions about the level of emissions likely to come from
one plant. This questioning revealed to the participants
that the Hart researchers assumed emissions would be lower,
based on monitoring data from cleaner plants than the
Commoner report relied on (Konkel). Once the dialogue
participants were able to understand the reasons for the
range of experts' opinions, they were able to devise
strategies to cope with the uncertainty and the likely
effects of smokestack emissions. With the mediator's
assistance the participants agreed to pursue further
research to improve monitoring procedures, explore the
advantages and limitations of recycling and separating solid
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waste, and to explore insurance options that would protect
the community against unanticipated events from the facility
operations (Block). Disputants and the Academy staff
believe that clarifying the reasons for the different risk
assessment estimates and experts' confidence in existing
monitoring procedures helped policy makers from the BOE
clarify the confusing technical information as they were
being asked to make decisions over whether to license
resource recovery facility (Block).
The City decided to go ahead and construct the first
plant, but the Request for Proposals required the project
developers to prepare a detailed emissions monitoring
program and to accept the liability for shutdowns if certain
operating criteria were not met (Susskind). Both
specification grew out of the dialogue session.
HOW MEDIATORS CAN HELP
Because mediators do not hold a stake in environmental
disputes and are interested in designing a fair process,
they can facilitate communication both among the experts and
between the experts and the disputants. As the New York
resource recovery cases shows, a mediator may convene
experts to dissect the underlying reasons for their
conflicting views. Uncovering the sources of the experts'
disagreement can, in turn, make it easier for experts to
communicate and for disputants to understand the diversity
of experts' views. During such dialogue sessions mediators
may ask probing questions to help experts uncover the
sources of their disagreement. In the NY case revealing the
21
sources of disagreement only occurred when the experts were
asked to explain their risk assessments to the other
participants (experts and lay people). Mediators can also
keep track of the key points on wall notes visible to all
participants. Susskind generated these wall notes which
helped participants shape strategies to monitor plant
operations. Even if all the points of disagreement are not
resolved at negotiations, the mediators can assist
disputants build contingency plans allowing them to adapt
their policies as new information becomes available. The NY
monitoring plans and strategies to use insurance to protect
residents against specified emissions levels were both
contingency type plans that come out of the dialogue
session.
It is easier for mediators to help when the
disputants want to be at the negotiating table. Disputants
will come to the negotiations only if they have no better
alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA) (Fisher &
Ury). The BOE alternative to participating for instance,
was to continue to bear scathing public outcries against the
facility. And, citizens groups could only turn to the court
and media. Disputants must also be willing to accept the
experts participation. If, for example, members of the BOE
had not met with experts contending different views, they
would have been less likely to understand the reasons behind
the vastly different risk assessments -- Commoner and Fred
C. Hart Inc.. Experts too must be open to discussing their
views. They must agree, like the disputants, that the
22
motivation behind their dialogue is to reach consensus on an
environmental policy.
CONCLUSION
In essence policy makers must realize that the
scientific analyses they request may often be in conflict.
The sources of the experts' disagreements range from
agreeing on analyses but presenting the information
differently to, fundamental differences in the design of the
research question. In either case, it is easier for policy
makers, or any individuals involved in a negotiation, to
interpret conflicting technical information if they know why
the experts disagree. If the disputants recognize the
difficulty they are having interpretating opposing experts'
views they may choose to call in a mediator, who as a non
partisan individual will not represent any disputant. The
mediator offers assistance in focusing discussions on why
the experts disagree. He or she can push experts to explain
the basis for their concluding statements and reveal
assumptions that shaped their studies.
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CHAPTER II
HELPING DISPUTANTS GAIN A SHARED UNDERSTANDING OF
THE NATURAL SYSTEM
In environmental disputes, I believe it is important for
disputants to hold a shared understanding of the water, air,
and land use system at the heart of the controversy.
Mediators can help the disputants achieve a better
understanding of such systems by working with experts
associated with the disputants (scenario A) or independent
analysts (scenario C) to explain how the systems work.
Shared understanding occurs when all the disputants have at
least the same basic knowledge about the natural or
technical system.
Roger Fisher and William Ury in Getting To Yes indicate
that diagnosing a problem, what I have called explaining the
relevant natural system, is a key ingredient to inventing
options that satisfy the disputants' interests. They point
out that, all too often negotiators fail to reach agreements
maximizing the gains for all parties because they did not
share the diagnosis of the problem. Thus, if the disputants
understand the systems central to the dispute, they are more
likely to invent options which expand the combined gains to
all parties (Fisher & Ury).
MODELING THE NATURAL SYSTEM
Support for this idea is offered by C.S. Hollings, in
Adaptive Environmental Management. He contends that policy
design should begin with a description of the natural
system. A model is frequently an effective descriptive
device. Ideal models of a natural system must be: specific,
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inclusive and transferable (Hollings). Hollings applied his
views as a technical expert hired to model the way forest
resources are affected by outbreaks of the spruce budworm
(Hollings).
Spruce Budworm Dispute
In the budworm case, Hollings and his colleagues
developed a model to help less technically oriented policy
makers understand the factors affecting a forest resource
system (Hollings). The experts were called in by policy
makers and did not represent any individuals or
organizations involved in the dispute. The environmental
policy question facing parties in New Brunswick, Maine was
how to effectively manage the spruce budworm. Periodic
outbreaks of the budworm had defoliated large areas of North
American forests. During one such outbreak, a substantial
proportion of the mature softwood forest was destroyed
(Hollings).
In response to concern over damage to forest resources
and regional economic viability, the Canadian government
undertook a spraying program to control the spruce budworm.
Although the spraying program minimized tree mortality, it
produced incipient outbreaks of the budworm over an even
greater area than before (Hollings). This occurred because
the spraying also killed the budworm's natural predators.
Policy makers, lumber industry representatives,
environmentalists, and scientific experts questioned whether
spraying was the appropriate technique to maximize timber
harvests and control the worms (Hollings).
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To help policy makers and interested citizens improve
their understanding of the budworm's lifecycle, the
government asked scientific experts, including Hollings, to
prepare an ecological model of the forest resource system
(Hollings). The experts were careful to incorporate in their
model any variable that had a major influence on the
ecosystem, thus making the model inclusive. The experts
initially included over 200 variables before categorizing
them into four groups: host trees, weather, and natural
enemies of the budworm (Hollings).
The resulting model was also specific because it
included trees native to the New Brunswick region and local
meteorological conditions (Hollings). Had the experts
adopted a general model of insect cycles they might have
overlooked unique local conditions such as the budworm's
natural predators living in the New Brunswick area.
To make the model transferable, the experts prepared a 4
minute motion picture describing their analyses. Workshops
were also held with other scientific experts, policy makers,
and environmentalists to discuss the accuracy of the model
(Hollings). The experts used these two media-- a film and
workshops -- to communicate the information in their model
to individuals interested in the problem. A successful
transfer occurred because, the non experts end up with a
shared working knowledge of the natural system (Hollings).
This case depicts the ingredients of a useful model
describing the natural system. In a negotiated setting,
similar descriptions could help disputants create agreements
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which would maximize their joint gains. Not all models
adhere to Hollings criteria and may in turn be less valuable
to disputants.
NOT UNDERSTANDING THE NATURAL SYSTEM
A dispute over the operating procedures of several
existing and one proposed nuclear power plant along New
York's Hudson River illustrates how employing a model that
is neither specific nor inclusive can prevent disputants
from reaching agreement (Talbot). Without a knowledge of
the river's ecology, the disputants found it difficult to
agree on appropriate operating practices for nuclear power
plants (Talbot).
Hudson River Dispute
The primary parties to the dispute over power plant
licenses were environmental organizations, utilities, and
the EPA. Environmentalists were represented by Scenic
Hudson, the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), and
the Hudson River Fisherman's Association. These groups were
concerned about the potential impact of plant operations on
fisheries, particularly striped bass. They suspected warm
water discharges and the absence of screens to prevent fish
from being sucked into cooling intake pipes were killing
many of the river's fish (Talbot).
Five utilities were involved in the dispute (Talbot).
Consolidated Edison and the New York State Power Authority
each owned a nuclear power plant at Indian point. Two new
and two older oil fired plants along the same 25 mile
stretch of the river were owned by a combination of: Central
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Hudson Gas and Electric, Niagara Mohawk, Consolidated
Edison, and Rockland Utility. Consolidated Edison was also
proposing an additional nuclear power plant at Storm King on
the Hudson. Because of its size and involvement in all the
proposed or recently built Hudson River plants, Con Ed
emerged as the lead utility (Talbot). In general, Con Ed
and the other utilities hoped to minimize plant construction
costs and operating costs. They were, however, willing to
alter their plans to protect the fisheries as long as the
existing plants remained profitable and the proposed nuclear
plant at Storm King would be profitable (Talbot).
EPA was responsible for assessing the combined effect of
all the plants when it assumed responsibility for curbing
pollution into the Hudson River, under the Federal Clean
Water Act.
After ten years of legal battles over power plant
operations on that stretch of the Hudson river, the parties
agreed to participate in a mediated negotiation (Talbot).
Russel Train, former EPA Administrator and President of the
World Wildlife Fund was selected by the parties to mediate
the dispute (Talbot).
At one point during the negotiations Train suggest a
technical subcommittee of experts, selected by the parties,
be formed to clarify the sources of fish mortality. The
experts were all representing disputants (scenario A).
These experts focused their research on the impacts to fish
from warm water discharges and cooling intake pipes, but did
not consider other possible causes of fish mortality. The
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disputants found the subcommittee's description of the way
fisheries were affected by river activities.
They contended that being sucked into a cooling intake
pipe or being exposed to warm water were only two of many
potential dangers to fish. Larger predators threaten fish
life. The availability of food, levels of pollution, and
the amount of rainfall also affect fish mortality (Talbot).
The subcommittee's work was rejected primarily because their
description of the natural system did not included these
factors (Talbot). Committee members felt that the experts'
model minimized the complexity of the factors affecting fish
mortality (Talbot).
In response to the Committee members concerns, the
mediator added non-experts to the technical subcommittee and
asked them to redesign a more comprehensive description of
the factors likely to cause fish mortality. The new
subcommittee accepted a more complex and inclusive model
developed by one of their members, who was a consultant to
the US Department of Interior. The consultant programmed
his computer to account for a variety of power plant
operations, including water runoff and pipe intakes; fish
population cycles; the level and direction of river flows;
and water temperature. The revised description was accepted
by the disputants and proved to be an important basis for
the final agreement (Talbot).
The mediator's response to modify the subcommittee
membership and suggest a new look at the problem helped
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maintain a problem solving momentum. Without his push, the
negotiations might have stalled.
BENEFITING FROM A SHARED UNDERSTANDING OF THE NATURAL SYSTEM
The Patuxent river water quality dispute illustrates how
a greater understanding of the natural system at the heart
of the dispute helped negotiators reach consensus. This
decade-long dispute over how to manage the river's water
quality was resolved after the technical experts
representing the disputants (scenario A) agreed on a
description of the Patuxent's hydrology. Prior to
mediation, the disputants were unable to agree on a water
pollution control strategy because, in part, their experts
disagreed on what to include in the hydrological model.
This vignette highlights how the mediator helped experts
debate the elements of their hydrological model and why this
debate was a necessary pre-condition to the experts reaching
consensus. The Patuxent dispute is also a good example of
how mediators can improve communication between experts and
disputants with minimal scientific backgrounds.
Patuxent River Dispute
The Patuxent river travels 110 miles from the rapidly
growing Baltimore/Washington suburbs through several rural
counties until it empties into the Chesapeake Bay. For over
a decade the fishing, farming and tourism interests along
the southern portion of the river were at odds with the
growing northern suburbs over water quality (Clark-McGlennon
(CNA)). Southern counties objected to the explosive
economic growth in the northern counties, which they
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believed degraded water quality in the southern portion of
the river. Northern counties were concerned that the
southern counties' proposals to restrict nutrient discharges
from Sewerage Treatment Plant's (STP's) would constrain
economic growth (CMA). Both sides had marshalled scientific
experts to challenge the other's hydrological model and
associated water pollution control strategies (CMA).
The 1977 Clean Water Act Amendments to the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act required EPA to raise the quality of
the water in the country's rivers to a "fishable and
swimmable" level. Regional Water Quality Management Plans
(208 plans), describing how these objectives would be met
were required for every river basin. Federal funding for
water quality improvement projects was tied to completion of
a 208 plan (CMA).
The Patuxent River 208 plan was the subject of
considerable debate. Disagreement over a nutrient control
strategy placed their $29 million federal grant in jeopardy
(CMA). The state Office of Environmental Programs (OEP),
however, managed to reserve the funds by agreeing to submit
a scientifically defensible, publicly acceptable water
pollution control strategy to EPA by January 15, 1982 (CMA).
OEP Assistant Secretary William Eichbaum believed
mediation could help the disputants reach agreement. The 43
parties to the negotiation included: state OEP officials;
the state's consultants; and scientific experts and
laypersons representing both the northern and southern
counties. Clark-McGlennon Associates (CMA), a private
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consulting firm with experience in environmental dispute
resolution was called in by Eichbaum to mediate (CMA).
The mediator scheduled two meetings - a technical
workshop and a larger negotiating session -- called a
charrette. The goal of the technical workshop was to reach
agreement on how the river functioned (CMA). The mediator
hoped that the scientific consensus would give the parties
at the subsequent charrette a shared understanding of the
Patuxent River's hydrology. The mediator also believed that
such a shared understanding would, in turn, help the parties
evaluate the ecological implications of alternative nutrient
control strategies (CMA).
Eighteen scientific experts participated in the day-long
technical workshop. They were selected to represent the
state's, northern counties', and southern counties' views
(CMA). Prior to the workshop, these technical experts had
never been asked to produce an agreement on how the river's
hydrological system operated (Sachs).
During the first part of the workshop, the mediator
asked the experts to focus on what they felt were the key
technical issues (Sachs). The experts recognized that
before they could discuss a hydrological model they had to
agree on basic assumptions (Sachs). They therefore
discussed and reached agreement on a data base of existing
pollutant levels, acceptable water quality thresholds, and
sources of pollution (Sachs). In the afternoon, the
experts analyzed how pollutants moved within a specific
section of the river. The emerging consensus contradicted
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traditional views. The experts agreed that nitrogen was at
least as damaging a pollutant as phosphorous (CMA). Until
the workshop, the state had been using a hydrological model
that focused on phosphorous and excluded nitrogen (CMA).
Phosphorous was traced to effluent from sewerage treatment
plants (STP's) located on the northern section of the river.
Runoff from the southern counties' farm fertilizer (and
manure) was judged by the experts to be the primary source
of nitrogen (CMA). The revised description was ultimately
more specific to the Patuxent region than the previous state
sponsored model, since it incorporated the farming activity
along the southern river banks.
Three aspects of the scientific consensus influenced the
final action plan agreed upon by the disputants.
1. The river has a "carrying capacity" which limits
the amount of phosphorous and nitrogen it can
accept,
2. nitrogen is a more harmful offender than
phosphorous and should be removed from the river,
and
3. non-point sources of nitrogen and sediment (i.e.
fertilizer and manure runoff) are responsible for
at least as much damage as point sources (i.e.
phosphorous).
At the conclusion of the meeting, the mediator
worked with the experts to write a working paper for the
less technically-skilled disputants describing the
experts' definition of water quality and their
suggestions about how best to manage and to maintain
water quality (CMA).
Participants at the follow-up charrette relied on
the consensus document to help them develop an
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acceptable nutrient control strategy (CMA). In this
case, there are at least two reason why the consensus
document effectively conveyed the experts' knowledge of
the natural system to the other negotiating parties.
First, the technical agreement was written in ordinary
language making it easier for non experts to understand
(CMA). Second, the mediators requested several of the
experts who participated in the technical workshop
attend the charrette to answer questions raised by the
participants (CMA).
At the end of the 3 - day charrette, the
negotiators agreed on a water quality plan that
satisfied the southern counties' concerns over water
quality, and the northern counties' concerns over growth
management. Since the plan also met EPA requirements
the Agency released the federal grant money to support
pollution control activities along the Patuxent (CMA).
HOW MEDIATORSCAN HELP
Without a mediator, experts may find it difficult
to communicate their analyses of complex systems to non
technical disputants. Mediators for example, can
encourage experts to use plain English in their
descriptions, making it easier for the disputants to
digest technical information. When they judge the
disputants will benefit from a discussion of the
scientific issues, mediators may suggest a meeting with
the experts. As a new intervenor to often long standing
disputes, mediators bring fresh spirit to the
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negotiations. Their encouragement can spark experts and
disputants to continue trying to reach agreement.
Reducing Jargon
Experts describing a natural or technical system
are likely to use a specialized vocabulary which may be
as difficult to learn as a foreign language. This was
true for experts involved in the Patuxent River dispute.
The mediator however, realized the level of jargon the
non-experts disputants would be able to comprehend
because he had discussed the technical issues with the
disputants prior to the negotiations (CMA). The
mediator suspected technical language would be most
troublesome when the experts explained the results of
their technical workshop to the disputants. Therefore
at the conclusion of the technical workshop, the
mediator suggested the experts prepare a document
describing their consensus on the river's hydrology in
ordinary language. The mediator reviewed each sentence
with the technicians to ensure it was written in plain
English (Sachs).
Though there was no mediator in the Spruce Budworm
dispute, the experts were particularly sensitive to
using confusing language. Because these experts were
aware of how lay people would react to ecological models
they took the time to think out a way of presenting
their analysis in comprehensible terms. Their solution
was to develop a film, in ordinary language, to explain
the model and hold a series of workshops during which
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individuals could question the experts' about how they
designed their model (Hollings).
Suggesting Meetings With Experts and Disputants
Mediators can suggest that the disputants request
the experts' attendance at negotiating sessions thus,
avoiding situations when the disputants must rely on the
experts' written reports to explain complex technical
ideas. In the Patuxent dispute the mediator suggested
that that technical experts participate in not only the
technical workshop but, be present at the charrette to
discuss their views on the river's hydrology (CMA). The
disputants agreed. The experts participation proved
instrumental in helping disputants internalize the
written description of the Patuxent's hydrology (Sachs).
Bringing A Fresh Problem Solving Spirit
Both the Patuxent and Hudson River disputes were
more than a decade old before a mediator joined the
process. The mediator offered new momentum and a
different approach to help resolve long lived
controversies. In the Patuxent dispute, the mediator
suggested a set of meetings and a schedule that helped
disputants envision an end to their dispute. The
mediator in Patuxent was also aided by a court imposed
deadline to reach consensus. Environmentalists, utility
and EPA representatives involved in the Hudson River
dispute were worn out by ten years of litigation and no
solution. They viewed mediated negotiation as a
preferable alternative to continued court battles.
36
According to a lawyer representing the utilities "It
(the legal battle) was getting boring" (Talbot, p. 13).
The environmentalists' attorney believed "no one would
benefit by continuing what amounted to a stalemate"
(Talbot, p.13). Thus, both sides' lawyers were ready
for the intervention of a mediator who, offered a new
process, negotiation, and who, they hoped, would kindle
a problem solving spirit (Talbot).
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CHAPTER III
HELPING DISPUTANTS UNDERSTAND THE CONSEQUENCES OF
PROPOSED AGREEMENTS
My second hypothesis is that consensus is more likely
when disputants understand the effects that proposed
agreements are likely to have on them. Experts, typically
associated with the mediator (scenario B), can be asked to
forecast the consequences of various proposals. If parties
to the negotiation do not comprehend the consequences of
alternative agreements, they may reject the proposals simply
because they do not trust the other disputants' motivations.
Even if disputants are confident that a proposal is offered
in good faith, they may still find it confusing to visualize
the results over time. Examining the long term effects to
the disputants is particularly useful in environmental
disputes, characterized by their complexity, technical
uncertainty, and impacts on future generations (Suaskind).
Finally, using experts' forecasts, based on a common set of
assumptions, provides disputants with a mutual picture how
the agreement could be implemented. Without a shared
forecast, disputants may reject a proposal because they
misinterprete a part of the agreement or because they adopt
inaccurate assumptions. Mediators can oversee experts who
are devising forecasts that will help disutants reach a non
partisan, long run, and common understanding of the
consequences of agreements.
COMPUTER MODELS AS FORECASTING TOOLS
Since many environmental disputes are multi-party and
involve complex natural systems (Bingham), it may be
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difficult to understand the consequences of proposed
agreements. Experts with specialized knowledge can assist
disputants envision how their interests will be affected by
alternative agreements. Often experts use computer-based
models to make forecasts. Computer models offer the
possibility of modifying components of possible agreements
to explore how such changes might affect disputants. Using
a computer model accepted by all disputants also allows
these negotiators to disassociate the proposed agreement
from the individual who suggests it.
The mediators role in these situations is to be sure
that the experts recognize the disputants' concerns so that
their models estimate how proposed agreements will affect
the disputants' interests. Mediators are therefore, often
involved in selecting independent experts and structuring
their forecasts to be both credible to disputants and
responsive to their concerns.
FORECASTING THE CONSEQUENCES OF AGREEMENTS
Disputants involved in the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency's (EPA's) first negotiated rulemaking project relied
on a computer model to overcome their bias towards a
particular proposal and to consider other proposals which
would satisfy their concerns. The expert's forecast also
aided disputants trying to envision how the impacts from the
agreement would change over time. In this case an expert
worked with the mediator (scenario B), though he was
tangencially associted with EPA.
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There are at least two reasons why the expert was able
to create a helpful forecast. First, he realize what the
disputants cared about since the mediator had pushed
disputants to articulate their interests and then focused
the negotiations on fulfilling the stakeholders' concerns.
The expert's model was, in turn, developed to demonstrate
how each proposal affected the disputants' primary
interests. Second, the mediator encouraged the expert to be
accessible to the disputants to discuss the assumptions
behind his model.
Noncomformance Penalties - Negotiated Rulemaking
In 1982, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
decided to test the usefulness of face-to-face negotiations
as a supplement to its existing rulemaking procedure
(Kirtz). In its first negotiated rulemaking demonstration,
EPA chose to negotiate Nonconformance Penalties (NCP's)
(Suaskind & McMahon). As part of the project the Agency
hired a mediator to improve communication among disputants
by convening and facilitating the negotiations (Schneider &
Tohn).
Under the Clean Air Act, EPA must set emission standards
for heavy-duty engines based on the performance of the most
"advanced" manufacturers. Section 206(g) of the Act
requires EPA to issue certificates of conformity to any
class or category of heavy-duty vehicles or engines that
exceeds an allowable emission level (Susskind & McMahon).
The nonconformance penalty (NCP) should be designed to cost
the engine manufacturer at least as much as compliance with
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the standard and create financial disincentives for
continued noncompliance. Though the Clean Air Act
amendments were passed in 1977, by late 1983 the Agency had
not yet developed NCP's (Suaskind & McMahon).
David Doniger, an attorney with the Natural Resources
Defense Council (NRDC), suggested that the EPA select NCP's
for its first negotiated rulemaking demonstration. EPA
agreed (Susskind & McMahon). In April 1984, EPA announced
its intent to Form an Advisory Committee of negotiate NCP's
(Susskind & McMahon). A 22-member negotiating Committee was
created under the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA)
(Suaskind & McMahon). Committee members included
representatives from the automobile and truck manufacturing
industries, state air quality agencies, EPA's Manufacturers
Operations Division (MOD), and NRDC. ERM-McGlennon
Associates were hired by EPA to convene and facilitate the
negotiating sessions (Schneider & Tohn). The mediators
(actually a team of up to three people, including myself)
believed their role included: identifying potential
stakeholders and understanding their concerns about NCP's;
scheduling training and negotiating sessions; facilitating
communication among disputants to help them reach consensus;
and suggesting ways the disputants think about using
technical experts (Schneider & Tohn).
At the first negotiating session, the mediator asked the
Committee members to separate the NCP issues into
categories. The disputants came up with three groups:
1. application of NCP's,
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2. penalty structure, and
3. administration and enforcement (Susakind & McMahon).
The mediator then suggested working groups, with
representatives from the manufacturing and environmental
communities, be formed to address each issue (Schneider &
Tohn). The penalty structure working group was saddled with
the task of devising a penalty formula acceptable to the
disputants. Representatives of the California Air Resources
Board, NRDC, EPA, Ford Motor Company and International
Harvestor served on the working group (Schneider). A
mediator was present at several working group meetings to
keep abreast of the issues the group was discussing so, that
he could explain the basis of the proposed formulas to other
negotiators (Susskind & McMahon).
Wayne Leiss, an Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
observer to the negotiations, volunteered to help the
working group. OMB was observing the negotiations to ensure
that EPA complied with an executive order requiring agencies
to make cost effective regulations. Leiss was interested in
the penalty formula, had a background in business
administration, and was familiar with computer-based
spreadsheets. After reviewing the proposed EPA penalty
structure, Leiss decided to develop a spreadsheet that would
help both the working group and full committee evaluate
alternative formula's (Leiss). In this case Leiss was a
cross between an expert associated with a mediator (scenario
B) and one associated with a disputant (scenario A).
Having observed all previous negotiating sessions, Leiss
had listened to the disputants express their concerns. It
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was relatively easy for him to pick up on these concerns
since the mediator had structured the negotiations to help
parties affected by the NCP's create a rule that satisfied
their interests (Schneider). At the negotiating sessions
the environmental representatives explained that they were
most concerned about the percentage of the industry that
would choose not to comply with the emissions standard and
thus, continue to pollute (Susskind & McMahon).
Manufacturers who might not be able to meet the new
emissions standard explained that they were concerned that
the penalty rates not force them out of business (Susskind &
McMahon).
Because Leiss recognized the disputants concerns he was
able, with the help of Bill Heglund from EPA, to create a
computer spreadsheet to assist disputants to estimate the
percentage of manufacturers unlikely to comply with the new
standard and the penalty these non-compliers would have to
pay. The model was developed using Lotus 123, a user
friendly spreadsheet software for a personal computer
(Leiss). The spreadsheet showed participants how
alternative formula's and altering basic assumptions, such
as engine costs impacted their concerns -- the percentage of
non-compliers and the penalty rate (Susakind & McMahon).
Disputants representing both sides found the spreadsheets
useful because they forecasted how many manufacturers would
likely to not comply and the rate these manufacturers would
be asked to pay (Susskind & McMahon).
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Leiss's model was more helpful to disputants than a
prior EPA model which only showed how agreements would
affect the percentage of non-compliers. The EPA model
essentially, did not aid manufacturer's trying to evaluate
whether the agreement meet their concerns (Leiss).
Another advantage to Leiss's spreadsheet was that it
presented forecasts for years one through five.
Environmentalists were particularly concerned that the
formula assess manufacturers who continued to pollute
increasingly large penalties thus, encouraging them to build
engines that would meet the emissions standard (Susskind &
McMahon).
The mediator mailed the experts' computer outputs
forecasting the impacts of at least five formulas to all
Committee members (Leiss). A sensitivity analysis, showing
how the percentage of non-compliers and penalty rates would
change using different parameter assumptions was presented
for each alternative. Disputants could therefore, observe
how each formula would affect them, given varying estimates
of the engine and the compliance costs (Susskind & McMahon).
The participants and mediator asked Leiss to bring his
personal computer to the final negotiating session. Until
this point, the negotiators only had access to computer
outputs produced by Leiss. They had not personally
experimented with changes in the formula (Susskind &
McMahon). One reason the parties took advantage of the
computer capability was that Leiss was accessible to the
disputants. He attended each full negotiating session and
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participated in the penalty rate working group meetings
(Susakind & McMahon). Regular contact with the negotiators
and mediator, as well as Leiss's interest in the formula,
made it easy for the negotiators to suggest he provide them
the chance to use his spreadsheet.
Two groups took advantage of the computer capability at
the final session (Susskind & McMahon). Representatives of
EPA, several states and NRDC caucused to discuss EPA's
estimates of engine costs. With access to the spreadsheet,
the group representing the environmentalists discovered that
they could achieve their goals using a variety of formulas.
Prior to the final session, the environmentalists focused on
a specific formula and appeared unwilling to consider
alternatives (Schneider).
Doniger and Tom Cackette, of the California Air
Resources Board caucused to devise a new set of parameters
and to run their proposed penalty structure on the computer.
Prior to the final session, Doniger and Cackette supported a
specific flat rate formula that ensured manufacturers not
complying with NCP's, so called "economic laggards", to pay
additional penalties (Susskind & McMahon). With the
spreadsheet accessible to the parties, Doniger and Cackette
were able to compare the impacts of their formula with other
alternatives. The computer forecasts helped Doniger and
Cackette to devise a solution that escalated penalty fees
each year a manufacturer did not comply with the emissions
standard but, where the first year's penalty was acceptable
to the manufacturers (Susskind & McMahon).
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One small manufacturer also relied on the spreadsheet to
determine the results of the penalty rate on his engine
costs. He was concerned that the penalty might be more than
he could afford. The computer output showed him that the
penalty was acceptable (Susskind & McMahon).
By the end of the final negotiating session, Leiss had
"run the numbers" for over 30 possible penalty structures
(Leiss). The impacts of each forecast were kept track of by
the mediator. The forecasts helped Doniger and Cackette to
overcome their previous distrust of the manufacturers'
proposals. The model revealed to the environmentalists that
there were a variety of formulas that would penalize
economic laggards (Schneider). Manufacturers also learned
that several of the proposal would not create penalties
forcing them to discontinue their production (Susskind &
McMahon).
The "11.37 a.m. scenario", (the time that the computer
printed out the final penalty structure), was accepted by
all the participants. The final rule adopted by EPA
includes the agreed upon formula (Schneider & Tohn).
This case illustrates how when the mediator helps the
expert recognize the disputants' concerns he or she is able
to develop forecasts that the disputants can use to assess
whether a proposal is suitable. The mediator met with the
parties to help them articulate their interests. During the
initial stakeholder interviews the mediator specifically
asked the disputants to describe their primary concerns
(Schneider & Tohn). But, the disputants tended to state
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their positions -- I can not accept a penalty above SX.
During several interviews, the mediators had to explain the
difference between positions and interests before the
disputants could articulate their concerns. Positions
describe what you want, while, interests describe why you
want it (Fisher & Ury).
The disputants' interests framed the negotiations
(Schneider). Environmentalists were willing to accept an
NCP as long as it minimized the number of manufacturers who
continued to exceed the emissions standards and provided
significant economic disincentives to continue paying the
penalty (Susskind & McMahon). Manufacturers were open to an
agreement if it did not set penalties that would put them
out of business (Susskind & McMahon). The expert's model
was thus, developed to help both interest groups envision
how alternative penalty formulas would impact their
concerns. The mediator also encouraged Leiss to explain the
assumptions behind his model to the disputants before they
evaluated the computer outputs and asked Leiss to run
alternative forumlas at the final session (Schneider). A
similar spreadsheet computer model was developed by experts
called in to assist a mediator working to resolve a sewerage
treatment financing question.
Camden Country Sewage Plan Dispute
In Camden County, New Jersey a dispute over financing
the regional sewage treatment system demonstrates how
disputants can benefit from a common expectation of how an
agreement will be implemented. The forecast gave the
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disputants a shared interpretation of how the agreement,
which was written to reflect principles the disputants
accepted, would translate into sewage disposal rates
(Center). Several municipalities relied on the technical
experts to help them gauge the agreement's long term
financial implications. The experts in this case were
managed by the mediator and did not represent any of the
disputants (scenario B). Without a credible estimate of how
the agreement would change their rates several disputants
were not willing to move ahead in negotiations (Center).
The mediator played a critical role in suggesting the
disputants use independent technical experts, helping design
the rate forumula, and working closely with the experts to
make sure their forecast gave the disputants useful
information.
Under the Clean Water Act, the 37 municipalities in
Camden County were forced to upgrade their sewerage
treatment facility. A new regional system was proposed.
But the municipalities that would be served by the system
realized that their sewage disposal rates would increase.
The issue was how to allocate the costs of a new system
among the 37 municipalities in the region (Center).
The dispute came before the New Jersey Superior Court.
After hearing initial testimony, Judge Lowengrub appointed a
special master to help disputants resolve their differences.
The New Jersey Center for Public Dispute Resolution (Center)
was selected by Judge Lowengrub to manage the mediation
process (Center). The Center selected Dr. Lawrence
48
Susskind, Executive Director of the Program on Negotiation
at Harvard Law School and Professor at the Massachusett's
Institute of Technology's Urban Studies Department to
mediate (Center).
The Center followed an eleven step process:
1. selected a mediator,
2. met with municipal representatives and other parties
with an interest in the dispute,
3. drafted an initial set of principles to serve as the
basis for an agreement,
4. convened the negotiating parties to discuss the draft
principles (June 10, 1985),
5. revised and finalized the principles,
6. conducted a statewide comparative survey of regional
utility and sewerage authorities' rate setting procedures,
7. developed a computer model, based on the negotiated
principles, forecasting municipal sewerage rates,
8. gathered baseline data on each municipality,
9. ran municipal data through the computer model to
forecast municipal rates under several scenarios,
10. completed follow-up conversations with the
municipalities to discuss the principles, municipal data
and computer forecasts, and
11. summarized the municipalities' views of the proposed
agreement in principle (Center).
Many disputants reserved judgement on the proposed agreement
"in principle," developed in steps 1 - 5, until they saw how
the principles would affect their sewage disposal costs
(Center). The municipalities' needs to understand how the
agreement might be converted into disposal rates indicates
how very difficult it may be for disputants to envision how a
complex agreement will be implemented. The agreement in
principle was open, municipalities felt, to various
interpretations (Center).
The mediator therefore, suggested and the disputants
agreed to hire independent technical experts to develop one
computer model for all the parties to estimate the likely
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sewage disposal rates (Center). Without the experts'
forecast the disputants might have rejected the proposal
simply because they thought it would result in inaffordable
rates.
The Center contacted several potential analysts with
experience in modeling water supply and disposal systems
before they contracted with the New Jersey Institute of
Technology's Center for Information Age Technology (NJIT)
(McGuire). NJIT professors respected for their water quality
modeling experience were selected to develop the computer
spreadsheet estimating likely modeling sewage disposal rates
(McGuire). Though the parties did not have an opportunity to
suggest alternative technical people, none objected to the
selection of the NJIT staff (Center).
Because the agreement in principle could be
interpretated in a variety of ways, the mediators asked that
the model be designed to forecast household rates for each
municipality (Center). The estimated rates were believable
to disputants, in part, because the Center gave them a chance
to review the baseline data on sewage flow and strength;
population; and number of households (steps 8 & 10). The
NJIT professors' reputations for previous water supply work
also enhanced the legitimacy of the forecasts (McGuire).
The Center directed the experts to forecast rates for
households in each of the 37 communities under four different
funding scenarios, since all were possible under the proposed
agreement (Center). The NJIT staff was also asked by the
Center to specify how the rates would change in the first,
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second, and fourth years of operation. The long term
forecast addressed municipalities concerned about how much
they might pay for the system before the section servicing
their area came on line (Center). The Center's staff was in
regular contact with NJIT to be sure that the experts were
creating a forecast that responded to the disputants concerns
-- household rates as each system component came on line.
The NJIT computer forecasts revealed that municipal
rates would probably be much lower than many municipalities
expected, but higher than one or two of the communities felt
they could afford (Center). A strong effort was made by the
Center to describe how NJIT came up with the forecasted
rates. The Center mailed the results of the forecasts to all
municipalities (Center). The mailing also included a summary
of the data used and a list of the modeling assumptions to
help explain to the disputants how the experts arrived at the
estimated rates.
Having seen the forecasts and the municipalities'
reactions, the mediation team -- Susskind and the Center's
staff-- believed that other solutions not originally
considered in the eleven step mediation process would be
needed to respond to several parties' concerns over the
disposal rates (Center). The judge concurred and agreed to
extend the duration of the mediation process by about 8
weeks. By the end of the extension the parties, with the
help of the mediator had negotiated a revised cost allocation
scheme (Center). The new formula was not based on the
quantity and quality of sewage flow, but on a much simpler
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flat household rate. The revised rate was calculated by
dividing the total billing units (households) by the total
system operating costs to yield a uniform household rate
(Olick). Industry and multi-family units could determine
their rates by using equivalent household charts which
transform non-residential uses to the equivalent single
family dwelling units. Municipalities were thus, able to
estimate their future rates under this revised formula
without a computer spreadsheet (Olick).
Judge Lowengrub accepted the revised agreement in
October 1985. The 37 municipalities are now negotiating
individual service agreements with the regional sewage
authority (Olick).
In this case the technical experts' forecast was helpful
because it responded to the disputants concerns and was
believable. The model's credibility was improved because the
mediators and experts gave the municipalities an opportunity
to confirm baseline data and provided municipal
representatives with an explanation of how the computer model
was developed. Without the documented NJIT forecast, the
municipalities might have arrived at different
interpretations of how the proposed agreement would affect
household sewerage disposal rates. These conflicting
opinions could have created a roadblock to future
negotiations. Instead, the experts' forecast became a mutual
base from which the disputants worked to create an acceptable
plan to finance the new regional system.
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As it was the forecast showed that the rates were
generally more affordable than many municipalities
anticipated, but above the maximum rate one particular
community could pay (Center). The subsequent negotiations
focused on devising a formula to support the new treatment
system that all municipalities could afford (Center).
One key to the successful use of the forecast was the
participation of the mediator. The mediator suggested that
the disputants use a technical analyst to forecast the rates
under the proposed agreement (Center). The Center assumed
responsibility for hiring and managing the NJIT professors.
This included almost daily contact (I worked with the Center
as a liason with NJIT) with the NJIT professors to go over
municipal data on population and sewage flow being collectd
by the Center and to update the experts on the likely funding
scenarios which would impact the forecasts. The funding
scenarios were prepared by consultants to the regional sewage
authority. The Center also documented the assumptions
underlying the NJIT model in a format disputants would be
able to understand. A step by step description of how the
experts arrived at the municipal rates and a summary of the
municipal data used in the model was prepared by the Center
and mailed out with all computer outputs.
An international negotiation over how to structure a
system to mine sea resources required a far more complex
computer model. Yet the impact of the experts' forecast was
much the same as in the NCP and Camden cases. The forecasts
gave negotiators a common understanding of how alternative
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agreement might affect them. This case offers an additional
illustration of how a common understanding of agreement
consequences helped delegates consider and accept a proposal
offered by perceived adversaries. Though there was no
offical mediator one delegate, in a quasi-mediator role,
encouraged the experts to explain their model thus empowering
disputants, as in the NCP case to invent agreements. As in
Camden case, the perceived objectivity and credibility of the
experts and their model made the delegates more willing to
believe the forecasts and use the model.
Law of the Sea Negotiations
In 1973 the United Nations General Assembly convened the
Third United Nations Conference on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
Delegates representing 150 countries were charged with
developing a plan to ensure all countries maintained an
equitable share of the benefits likely to be realized from
commercial mining of copper, cobalt, nickel, and manganese
from the ocean floor (Sebenius 1984).
By 1978 the LOS negotiators reached agreement on 90% of
the contentious issues (Sebenius 1984). Two of the remaining
issues were financial. First, the delegates could not agree
on a system of payments,(including fees, royalties, and
profit shares) private mining operations would pay to other
countries supporting the international mining system
(Sebenius 1984). Second, the delegates were concerned over
how to finance the operations of the organization they hoped
to create to manage all seabed mining activities (Sebenius
1984).
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A negotiating group was created to tackle these
financial issues. Singapore's Ambassador to the United
Nations, Tommy T.B. Koh, chaired the group (Sebenius 1984).
One of Koh's first actions was to establish a group of
"financial experts" to help less technical delegates in the
group understand the financial issues. In one of Koh's
reports about the negotiation he stated:
In the group of financial experts we were
immediately confronted with the need to agree
on a set of assumptions. Without an agreed
framework of assumptions it would not have
been possible for us to carry on with our
deliberations. We agreed that the best study
to date was that undertaken by MIT, entitled,
"A Cost Model of Ocean Mining and Associated
Regulatory Issues" (Sebenius 1984, p.97).
Koh's remarks indicate that the experts played a vital role
from the outset and that the mediator and the disputants, as
in the Camden case, decided to call in independent experts to
explain how proposed agreements would financially affect each
country.
The model chosen by the group was designed by a team led
by J.D. Nyhart, a Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
Professor at the Sloan School of Management and the
Department of Ocean Engineering. The team received support
from the Sea Grant Program, a maritime educational branch of
the Department of Commerce to develop a computer model that
could compare a hypothetical deep ocean mining systems under
various conditions (Raiffa 1982).
In contrast to the NCP and Camden County negotiations,
the model was not developed initially for the negotiations
(Sebenius 1984). A second distinction was that the MIT model
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was far more complex than either of the two used in the NCP
or Camden County disputes. Those spreadsheets were developed
on Lotus 123 and run on a personal computer. The MIT model
was specifically programmed and run on a larger main frame
computer (Sebenius 1981). The model permitted a quantitative
comparison of the outcomes assuming different physical,
engineering, financial, and regulatory conditions (Sebenius
1981). For example, the model was used to determine how
altering the royalties miners would pay to the international
community, or changing the discount rates would affect the
rate of return individual mining operations could expect
(Sebenius 1981).
Nyhart's team derived and documented independent
estimates of more than 150 principal parameter values to
specify a baseline case (Sebenius 1981). The estimates
included costs for research and development; prospecting and
exploration; capital investment in mining, transportation,
processing; and operating costs. Together these inputs were
used to derive the mining rates of return and the costs to
each nation of participating in the mining operation which
were the primary financial concerns the that delegates were
evaluating proposals against (Sebenius 1984).
Despite the highly charged political atmosphere of the
UNCLOS negotiations, the model was credible to the
negotiating parties (Raiffa 1982). There are at least three
explanations (Sebenius 1984).
First, the model was not originally designed for the
UNCLOS negotiations (Sebenius 1984). In fact, the technical
56
report accompanying the model made scant reference to the
UNCLOS negotiations. Non association with UNCLOS tended to
reinforce the delegates' perceptions that the model was not a
political tool of any one party (Sebenius 1984).
Second, the model underwent critical peer review at two
previous professional conferences (Sebenius 1984).
Academics, -technical representatives of all the major mining
consortia, and assorted U.S. government scientists offered
their comments on the model's structure, equations, and
parameter values. The MIT team incorporated these comments
into a revised model (Sebenius 1984).
Third, when the first run of the model at the UNCLOS
negotiations pleased no delegation, the model's credibility
was further enhanced (Sebenius 1984). The baseline 18%
profitability rate contradicted persistent claims by
developed countries that their miners would be unable to pay
suggested fees and royalties. The profitability rate also
crushed developing countries' hopes that seabed mining would
generate vast revenues for the world community (Sebenius
1984).
At Koh's urging the MIT experts explained their model at
an informal seminar for members of the financial negotiating
group (Sebenius). These session marked the first time that
the delegates began to experiment with and trust the results
of the forecasts (Sebenius 1984). The seminar was held under
Quaker and Methodist auspices, on neutral ground. Attendees
questioned the model's assumptions, in particular its
baseline values. MIT team members responded to queries by
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explaining the basis for their assumptions and by
demonstrating the model's sensitivity to each factor under
discussion (Sebenius 1984).
To demonstrate the model's capabilities Norway's
delegate suggested that they run his proposal (Sebenius
1984). The expert team constructed several economic and
technical scenarios under which Norway's proposal would
actually produce profitability rates that would be
unacceptable to Norway (Sebenius). Not surprisingly the
demonstration induced the Indian delegate to ask what the
results of his proposal would be (Sebenius 1984). Having
already analyzed the Indian proposal, the MIT team was able
to show that profitability under the Indian proposal would
also drop at least as much as under the Norwegian proposal
(Sebenius 1984). These test runs pushed both the Norwegian
and Indian delegates to modify their initial proposals
(Sebenius 1984).
Between 1978 and 1979 Koh encouraged the delegates to
meet with the MIT experts to learn more about seabed
economics and their financial model (Sebenius 1984). These
ongoing meetings gave delegates regular opportunities to use
the complex model which they were beginning to feel more
comfortable with (Sebenius 1984). After two years of
meetings, Koh offered a compromise proposal on financial
arrangements. The delegates were now knowledgeable enough
about the consequences of a variety of complex financial
arrangements to recognize an acceptable proposal (Sebenius
1984). By this time the delegates also trusted the MIT model
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enough to rely on the model's estimates as a primary
evaluation tool (Sebenius 1984).
Delegates from both developed and developing countries
believed that the Koh compromise satisfied their interests
(Sebenius 1984). Developed countries were concerned about
their access to seabed mining resources and the rate of
return on country sponsored mining operations (Sebenius
1984). Developing countries were wanted to be sure that they
maintained control over international mining even though
their countries would probably not have the experience and
finances to actually mine resources. Like developed
countries, these third world countries were also concerned
about the money that they might expect from international
mining (Sebenius 1984). According to James Sebenius,
The results of two years of education made
the technical elements of Koh's compromise
seem quite clear to a large number of key
delegates in the regional groups. Although
there were angry rumblings from India and the
European Economic Council (for opposite
reasons), the main elements of the new Koh
proposal survived widespread debate in the
1979 and the subsequent 1980 sessions
(Sebenius 1984, p.39).
The hurdle posed by the differing financial intentions was
surmounted. The MIT model helped the delegates develop and
jointly test the outcomes of proposed financial plans. It is
hard to overestimate the effect of this model had on the
financial deliberations of the negotiating group (Sebenius
1984).
Although the United States eventually presented a long
list of objections that prevented it from signing the final
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LOS convention, the financial terms were not an obstacle to
the signing (Sebenius 1984).
The UNCLOS illustrates how technical experts can use a
model the disputants find credible to evaluate proposals that
might not have been considered because they were viewed as
championing a political cause. The case also raises the
possibility that disputants can learn enough about extremely
complex models to use the computer to invent solutions, if
the experts meet with them to discuss how the computer model
works.
In this case there was no mediator, but a combination of
the technical team and a lead delegate, Koh who assumed the
mediator's responsibility for helping delegates understand
how the model worked. Koh also arranged several training
sessions in which delegates could ask MIT experts questions
about seabed economics and about how the MIT model was
developed. These sessions eventually gave the delegates
enough confidence in judging alternative proposals to be able
to recognize when a solution satisfied their interests
(Sebenius 1984). Koh eventually offered the final solution
that satisfied the disputants' interests. The technical team
also played a key role. They were interested in helping the
delegates reach agreement and applying their model to a real
world controversy (Sebenuis 1984). The experts were thus,
open to meeting with the delegates to discuss possible
solutions to the financial issues facing UNCLOS.
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HOW MEDIATORS CAN HELP
It is impossible to know whether the disputants in the
three cases described above would have reached consensus
without the use of the technical forecasting tools made
available to them through the mediator (scenario B). Yet in
the NCP, Camden and UNCLOS cases the parties were able to
reach consensus, in part, because they got a clearer common
understanding of how alternative proposals would affect them.
I draw three conclusions from these cases that describe how
having a mediator made the experts' forecasts useful to
disputants.
Meeting With Disputants to Uncover Their Interests
First, the mediator met with disputants to help them
describe their concerns. The disputants were, in turn, able
to articulate these concerns to the experts and to insist
that the forecasting models showed how proposed agreements
were likely to affect the parties' interests. In the NCP
negotiations, the expert was aware of the disputants'
concerns partly because he had observed previous negotiating
session in which the mediator framed the negotiating issues
in terms of the parties interests (Susskind & McMahon). He,
therefore, developed a model to show the environmentalists
the number of manufacturers who would continue to pollute and
to show the manufacturers the penalty rates they could expect
to pay should they not meet EPA emissions standards (Susskind
& McMahon). The computer forecast might have included less
helpful indicators of the consequences had the mediator not
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insisted the disputants forthrightly articulate their needs
for agreement.
Experts in the other two cases relied on the mediator or
lead negotiator to describe the disputants' concerns. The
NJIT professors met with the mediator to go over what the
model should measure. As a member of the mediation team I
regularly met with experts at the New Jersey Institute to
review their computer outputs. My goal was to ensure that
the experts' computer runs estimated household sewage
disposal rates being served by the system before and after
the municipality was hooked up to the new system (Center).
Disputants at previous negotiating sessions and meetings with
the mediator had identified these two points as their primary
concerns (Olick). In the UNCLOS case, lead delegate Koh and
the experts themselves assumed responsibility for checking
with the disputants to be sure that the forecast was giving
them useful information on how each proposal would likely
affect mining returns for both developed and less developed
countries (Sebenius 1984).
Encouraging Experts to Explain Their Analyses
Second, a forecast is more useful to the disputants when
they believe the model is credible. In the Camden and UNCLOS
cases and to a lesser extent in the NCP negotiations, the
forecasts were acceptable to the disputants partly because
the mediator encouraged the experts to explain their models'
assumptions and provided the parties a chance to modify the
basic data. If the disputants understand the basis for the
forecast it will diminish the chances that a stakeholder will
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wonder how a number was arrived at or, that the stakeholder
will find it difficult to explain to their constituents why
the agreement fulfills the groups' interests.
During the final computer runs in the Camden case, a
mediation team member helped the experts document the
assumptions behind their model in language the disputants
would understand. Each municipality was also given two
opportunties to provide basic data that was input into the
model (Center). Delegates to the UNCLOS negotiations were
also provided an opportunity to review the data used in the
much more complex MIT model (Sebenius 1984). And, lead
negotiator Koh convened several sessions in which the MIT
experts explained the way their model worked. The mediator
in the NCP case did not insist that the expert clearly
describe the underlying rationale for his model (Susskind &
McMahon). Instead, they relied on his ability to explain the
basis for the model in penalty working group meetings and
that working group members would help their fellow
negotiators understand the model (Susskind & McMahon).
Helping Disputant Select Credible Experts
The credibility of the models used at all three
negotiations was further enhanced by the experts'
reputations. The medatiator can play a critical role in
selecting these experts. In the Camden County case, the
mediator not only suggested the concept of using experts but,
investigated the track record of potential anlaysts. Led
delegate Koh in the UNCLOS dispute recommended that the
delegates consider using the MIT model since, it had already
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undergone an outside peer review (Sebenius 1984). This type
of independent critique however, is less likely to occur in
smaller disputes where the models are developed on existing
software.
Arranging Meetings To Learn About and Use the Computer
Finally, in two of the three cases the mediator
arranged meetings in which the disputants were given the
tools to use the model to invent solutions. After numerous
working group meetings in the NCP case, and background
sessions in the UNCLOS case, the disputants felt comfortable
enough with the model to test the implications of new ideas
without feeling committed to defend them. By drafting
alternative financial approaches, disputants in the NCP and
UNCLOS negotiations were able to overcome their distrust of
particular proposals thus, facilitating agreement (Susskind &
McMahon; Sebenius 1984).
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CHAPTER IV
HELPING DISPUTANTS UNDERSTAND THE SOURCES OF EXPERTS'
DISAGREEMENT AND UNCERTAINTY
Disagreement among experts per se is not an obstacle to
making environmental policy. It is primarily when
disputants do not understand the reasons for scientific
uncertainty or the sources of the experts disagreement that
they will find it difficult to reach consensus. Without a
way of untangling the web of conflicting experts' views,
disputants may find the technical issues critical to the
debate unmanageable. Experts expressing conflicting
opinions are often representing disputants (scenario A) or
are part of a debate among experts that is separate from
either the disputants or the mediator (scenario C). If
disputants are willing to accept a mediator to help them
understand why the experts can not agree, this non-partisan
helper can assist them by: suggesting a process to discuss
the disagreement, maintaining a visual record of the
discussion, and then sorting issues into categories.
IGNORING THE SOURCES OF DISAGREEMENT
Not exploring the sources the experts' disagreement
hindered representatives from the EPA and the Tennessee
Eastman company from reaching agreement on the
specifications for a water pollution discharge permit (Bacow
& Wheeler). One obstacle to consensus was that the parties
disagreed on the causes of the river's weed problem (Bacow &
Wheeler). Consensus might have been achieved if the experts
from EPA and Eastman had explored why they held conflicting
views.
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Tennessee Eastman Dispute
To comply with the federal Clean Water Act (1972), the
Tennessee (TN) Eastman Kodak company submitted an
application that would allow the company to continue
discharging waste water from its plant operations into the
Holston river. Under the Clean Water Act, all discharges
must be authorized by the EPA. In 1977 the EPA adopted a
National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) to
permit discharges into the country's rivers and streams, as
regulated under the Clean Water Act.
TN Eastman is a major chemical processor. Its plant in
Kingsport, TN spans more than 400 acres and employs
approximately 12,000 people. At the time of the permit
review the plant discharged between 400 - 500 million
gallons per day of treated waste water to the Holston River.
An average city of 5 million people produces roughly the
same amount of waste water discharges (Bacow & Wheeler).
At the center of the controversy over the discharge
permit was a disagreement over the appropriate nutrient
control limits (Bacow & Wheeler). EPA's analyst asserted
that the company must meet strict nitrogen and phosphorous
discharge limits. Experts hired by Eastman argued that
EPA's water quality model did not consider all the relevant
sources of nitrogen and phosphorous and, that the company
was not the only significant source of these chemicals
(Bacow & Wheeler).
Experts representing EPA met with TN Eastman's experts
to try and iron out their differences (scenario A). One of
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the three issues on their agenda was the effects of nutrient
discharges on weed growth. This was, in part, dependent on
the amount of dissolved oxygen likely to be found in the
water under various scenarios (Bacow & Wheeler). Let me
explain why.
The level of oxygen in a river affects fish life. When
waste enters a river in large quantities a river's oxygen
supply becomes depleted. Microorganisms digest the waste,
breaking it down into its essential elements -- generally
nitrogen, phosphorous, and carbon. These microorganisms
draw oxygen to digest waste. The more waste digested by
microorganisms, the more oxygen is drawn from the stream.
If the level of dissolved oxygen falls below three to five
parts per million, fish are adversely affected. If the
oxygen level drops to zero all fish life is killed and
odorous gases are emitted (Bacow & Wheeler, p.79).
EPA's argument for restricting nutrient limits was based
on a laboratory test of river water which suggested that
point discharges of nitrogen and phosphorous were primarily
responsible for the downstream weed problem. TN Eastman's
consultants disagreed. They claimed that nutrients from
nitrogen and phosphorous discharges could also be traced to
river bottom deposits and river flows from the North Fork of
the Holston River. Since these sources of nutrients were
not likely to be regulated in the future, TN Eastman
contended that it did not make sense for EPA to impose
expensive discharge controls on the company. The
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unregulated sources would continue to produce weed problems,
no matter what action TN Eastman took (Bacow & Wheeler).
The experts at the technical meeting tried to negotiate
a middle ground compromising the EPA and Eastman positions
(Bacow & Wheeler). But they did reach a compromise position
(Bacow & Wheeler). And, the experts did not understand
whether it was uncertainty over the sources of the
nutrients, effects of the nutrients on weeds, or the
validity of the laboratory tests on dissolved oxygen that
lay at the heart of their disagreement.
At a subsequent public hearing, TN Eastman's experts
presented over 70 pages of comments on the proposed
discharge permit. TN Eastman's experts overpowered EPA and
the Agency accepted TN Eastman's claims.
In the end, senior EPA officials decided to settle
(accept the TN Eastman water quality model)
because the costs of continuing the dispute
were just too great in light of the potential
benefits (Bacow & Wheeler, p.89).
The negotiating parties -- company, environmentalists, and
EPA -- never gave themselves the chance to agree on an
acceptable discharge level, primarily because they did not
clarify the reasons for their conflicting views. Had they
explored why Eastman's experts asserted less strict nutrient
control limits, or why they felt unsure about EPA's reliance
on laboratory tests, they might have been able
collaboratively to develop a research agenda to resolve
remaining scientific questions or to develop contingency
plans should certain expectations over the origins of
pollution prove true. The disputants lack of consensus over
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the nutrient control strategy makes the decision vulnerable
to challenge.
EXPLORING SOURCES OF UNCERTAINTY AND DISAGREEMENT
In many environmental disputes the available level of
scientific knowledge is not sufficient to answer every
question raised; scientific uncertainty and disagreement
will come into play (Hollings; Douglass & Wildavsky).
Scientists are always trying to gain a clearer understanding
of how pollutants travel through the air, or how certain
species of fish react to particular chemicals. They also are
continuing to refine their estimates of the probability of
harm coming to an individual from exposure to a substance or
situation or, the likelihood of future events (Morgan;
Ruckelshaus). Yet, parties to environmental disputes must
make policy decisions without the benefit of conclusive
scientific proof. Scientists as I pointed out in Chapter I
may disagree, in part, because they have different levels of
confidence in their analyses, because there is a research
gap, or because there are differences in the design of their
inquiry.
Since uncertainty and disagreement among experts are
likely to exist, the question is how to cope. I have
selected two cases that illustrate ways of resolving
environmental disputes in the face of inconclusive analyses
and competing experts' opinions. Mediators in each case
helped the experts either define a research agenda to resolve
unanswered scientific questions or helped the experts see
that their disagreement could be traced to different levels
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(one was more comprehensive than the other) of analysis.
Only by exploring the reasons for the experts' disagreement
were the mediators able to suggest ways for the disputants to
use the technical information and reach consensus.
Scientific uncertainty over the impacts of oil drilling
on fisheries in California's Santa Maria Basin fueled a long
standing dispute between the fishing and oil industries.
But the existence of uncertainty did not freeze the parties.
Instead the mediator suggested that the disputants work with
the experts to forge a joint research agenda which would
address the scientific questions underlying the experts'
uncertainty (Suaskind & McCreary).
Santa Maria Basin Dispute
Since the late 1960's fisherman had complained that oil
drilling activity reduced fish catches (Susskind & McCreary).
Oil industry representatives contested these claims (Susskind
& McCreary). To help resolve this dispute, representatives
from both sides agreed to ask a mediator for help. As the
mediation progressed, it became clear to the mediator and
participants that the dispute hinged on the different
expectations of risks from oil drilling (Susskind &
McCreary). Actually, neither side had assessed the effects
of oil drilling activities on fisheries. None of the
disputants for example, had research in hand describing the
effects of seismic surveys or boat traffic on fisheries
(Susakind & McCreary).
To further explore the relationship between oil drilling
and fish catches, the mediator suggested that the disputants
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convene a panel of experts on fish behavior and acoustics
(Susskind & McCreary). The disputants agreed that the
negotiations could not continue until the experts discussed
how fish are truly affected by oil exploration. Thus, with
the disputants approval, the mediator secured funding and
invited participants to a 3-day workshop to prepare a
detailed research plan. Participants included experts on
various fish species, acoustics and several academic
specializations, as well as representatives from both the
fishing and oil industries. The workshop was facilitated by
a mediator who assisted the participants keep track of their
points of agreement and disagreement and, who coordinated the
workshop schedule (Susskind & McCreary).
In this case the disagreement was overcome by reducing
the level of uncertainty. By gathering experts and
disputants together, the mediator was able to help them
identify a gap in the existing research on seismic activity.
The joint research agenda that came out of the mediated
workshop answered questions over the effects of seismic
activity of fish on which the dispute hinged (Susskind &
McCreary). The disputants agreed to use the research results
as the basis for state regulations governing oil exploration
(Suaskind & McCreary).
The mediator's suggestion to convene a workshop proved
particularly helpful to the disputants. Out of the workshop
came the research that ultimately shaped the regulatory
policy (Susskind & McCreary). At the workshop itself the
mediator continued to play an important role by maintaining a
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group memory of the key points. This common visual record
assisted participants once they tried to generate the joint
research agenda. Finally, it appears that the mediator
offered a new problem solving approach.
Patuxent River Dispute
The Patuxent River dispute offers a different result
from exploring the sources of the experts disagreement. A
mediator involved in this long standing water quality
controversy over Maryland's Patuxent river helped negotiators
understand how discharges of nitrogen and phosphorous might
affect the river's water quality. The disputants were able
to devise a water quality management plan once the mediator
helped the experts reached agreement on how to model the
river's hydrological system (Clark-McGlennon (CMA) ). The
mediator played a key role in this process by suggesting a
separate session for technical experts to discuss their
conflicting descriptions of how the river handled pollutants.
Then at the session, the mediator kept track of the issues
under discussion, proposed ways of disaggregating the
components of the model, all with a goal towards honing in on
why the experts disagreed.
Prior to mediation uncertainty over the probable effect
of nitrogen and phosphorous on water quality had stalled
previous attempts to develop a water pollution control
strategy. At the mediator's suggestion, experts representing
counties along the river participated in a technical workshop
to analyze why they disagreed (scenario A) (CMA). During
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the session, they recognized that they held different views
on the:
(1) sources of nitrogen and phosphorous,
(2) the way the river flows, and
(3) how the flow was affected by seasonal changes
(Sachs).
The experts then debated the elements of the
hydrological model and the baseline data which would be input
into the model. They recognized that experts representing
the northern counties previously omitted nitrogen discharges
from their model because they did not have the resources to
prepare a comprehensive study (5achs). By the end of the
meeting the experts reached agreement on the issues in all
three categories. Their agreement was recorded in a
consensus document written with the mediator and presented to
the non-expert negotiators at a follow up session (CMA).
Disputants were able to agree on the water quality management
plan once the experts settled their differences (CMA; Sachs).
This vignette demonstrates that in some situations
disagreement among experts can be resolved when a non
partisan helper convenes experts with the goal of analyzing
the reasons why they do not agree. Though the debate had
been active for over a decade, it took the intervention of
the mediator and a court imposed deadline to motivate experts
representing the disputants (scenario A) to sit down and
discuss their differences. The mediator encouraged these
experts, listened to them discuss their views and record the
issues in categories to highlight points of agreement and
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disagreement. At one point the mediator drew a spreadsheet
and asked the experts to fill in their views under several
headings which included: sources of pollutants, pollutant
thresholds, and monitoring procedures (Sachs). By using this
tool the mediator aided the experts in fractionalizing their
disagreement. The chart showed them that the primary reason
for their disagreement was a conflicting view on the sources
of pollutants, a difference which was easily remedied
(Sachs). One set of experts pursuaded the others that their
analysis was more comprehensive and thus accurate, since it
included both southern and northern counties discharges
(CMA).
HOW MEDIATORS CAN HELP
When the experts disagree, the challenge is to figure
out why. In these situations, as illustrated by the Santa
Maria Basin and Patuxent River disputes the mediators can be
particularly important. Mediators can suggest ways of
integrating technical analyses, moderate discussions by
keeping visual track of the issues prompting both the experts
and disputants to remember points which may become the basis
for agreement. Aside from recording issues, mediators can
also sort complex information into categories making it less
confusing for participants to distinguish between points of
disagreement and the reasons for the disagreement.
Proposing Forums For Dialogue
Mediators in both the Santa Maria and Patuxent cases
proposed a process in which experts could meet with the
explicit purpose of understanding why they disagreed. A
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workshop was used in the Santa Maria case, while the mediator
in the Patuxent dispute convened a technical session open
only to experts (Susskind & McCreary; CMA). No matter the
forum, the point to remember is that since the mediator
assumes responsibility for the negotiation process, he or she
is able to invent a setting that allows experts to realize
why they are arguing opposing points.
Creating Visual Group Records
To record the issues being discussed, mediators
commonly take notes on large pieces of paper tacked to the
wall. These "wall notes" create a group memory. In the
Patuxent River technical workshop the mediator created large
spreadsheets visible to all experts (Sachs). These sheets
were developed to show experts different ways of categorizing
their disagreement. The mediator listened to the experts
discuss the various aspects of the river system before
suggesting the group consider tackling the issues one at a
time. He then proposed a list of points for discussion that
included: sources of pollutants, direction and rate of river
flows, seasonal adjustments, water quality standards, and
pollutant impacts on the these standards (Sachs). By
disaggregating the larger issue -- the hydrological model --
the mediator got the experts to zero in on why they held
different views. The experts eventually realized that the
reason they could not agree was because they did not consider
the same sources of pollutants (CMA).
A less extensive set of wall notes was used by the
mediator in the Santa Maria Basin case who maintained a group
75
record of workshop discussions. These records were, in turn,
relied upon by the participants and mediator to summarize the
three days of workshop sessions. The final research agenda,
supported by the disputants was created during this workshop
(Susskind & McCreary).
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS
Environmental mediators can use technical expertise to
help disputants deal with their differences. One challenge
confronting mediators is how to facilitate communication
both among the experts and between the experts and less
technically-skilled disputants. The following
recommendations will help mediators to use scientific and
technical expertise to its fullest potential. I offer my
suggestions under the three hypotheses put forth in this
thesis.
HELPING DISPUTANTS UNDERSTAND THE NATURAL SYSTEM
As illustrated in Chapter II, disputants are more
likely to reach consensus if they understand the natural
system at the heart of the controversy. Mediators can make
it easier for experts to explain their analyses of such
systems. Recall that the experts describing the system are
most likely to be working for the disputants (scenario A) or
be independent of either the disputants and the mediator
(scenario C). My advice is offered to mediators hoping to
improve communication among experts and disputants.
* Uncover potential gaps between the terminology experts
are likely to use and the language familiar to disputants.
If the gap is wide, consider ways to both improve
disputants knowledge (i.e. technical workshop, glossary)
and encourage experts to use ordinary language.
* Be sure the experts know the geographic bounds and
political jurisdictions of the conflict. The experts'
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descriptions and analyses will be more valuable to the
disputants if they are consistent with these boundaries.
* If during the negotiation process you find yourself
shuttling endlessly between the experts and the disputants,
suggest a meeting be held in which the disputants pose
their questions directly to the scientists.
HELPING DISPUTANTS UNDERSTAND THE CONSEQUENCES OF AGREEMENTS
Experts can also help disputants envision how proposed
agreements are likely to affect them. The experts in this
situation are typically associated with the mediator
(scenario B). Mediators working with these experts should
consider the following advice.
* Prior to negotiations, interview potential disputants
and ask them to describe their true concerns. If they
state their positions instead of their interests, try to
explain the difference and encourage them to articulate
their interests.
* If the disputants are having difficulty envisioning how
proposals will affect them, consider recommending that the
group contract with a non partisan expert to forecast the
consequences of alternative agreements (scenario B).
Having an independent forecast may also improve situations
in which disputants are unwilling to evaluate solutions
offered by negotiators they mistrust. If the disputants
agree to use an expert, be sure to help them develop
selection and funding criteria. Ask the disputants to
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consider appointing a liaison between the expert and
disputants. The mediator, as a non-partisan helper, is
probably the most appropriate choice.
* Be sure the experts include issues important to the
disputants in their forecasts.
* As the experts are constructing their forecast, insist
that they give the disputants a chance to review the basic
data. When the parties to the negotiation have access to
the data, they are more likely to accept the results.
* Request that the experts document their data sources and
describe the assumptions behind the model in simple
language. This improves the likelihood that the disputants
will understand and trust the experts' analysis. Consider
helping experts prepare these explanatory notes to ensure
that they are in a form the disputants will find useful.
* If the disputants ask to use the model to invent
solutions, try to locate a meeting space that meets the
experts' needs and one that is not associated with any of
the disputants. This may mean finding access to specific
computer hardware or devising a way of getting the experts'
equipment to the session.
HELPING DISPUTANTS UNDERSTAND THE SOURCES OF EXPERTS'
DISAGREEMENT AND UNCERTAINTY
As I discussed in Chapters I and IV the experts, be they
representing a disputant (scenario A) or independent of the
disputants and the mediator (scenario C), may disagree. But,
disputants can make decisions even when no scientific
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consensus exists. One key to moving ahead in spite of the
disagreement is understanding why the experts hold
conflicting views. Mediators can help disputants understand
the reasons for the experts' disagreement, by following the
below advice.
* If the disputants feel frustrated by the lack of expert
consensus, try to convene a dialogue session to explore the
reasons for the disagreement. This is only likely to be
useful if the experts are willing to participate in the
problem-solving process.
* When the experts are describing their analyses help
people remember key points of the discussion by maintaining
a visual record, such as a group memory.
* Another task during discussions is to help participants,
be they experts or a mixture of experts and disputants,
sort out issues. This disaggregation makes it easier for
participants to incrementally build agreement. Agreement
may mean resolving a previously disputed point, developing
a plan to address specific scientific questions, or
generating strategies that allow disputants to act in the
face of uncertainty.
Finally, along with these techniques and skills,
mediators should remember that they can bring energy to the
negotiations. This momentum can spark disputants to resolve
their differences.
80
QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE RESEARCH
As I continue to think about using scientific and
technical expertise in environmental mediation, I hope to
pursue additional questions raised by this thesis. Under
what circumstances for example, are my suggestions to
mediators applicable across hypotheses ? Does the structure
of the experts' involvement (i.e. scenarios A, B, and C)
make it more likely for each of the hypotheses to be
relevant. How much technical knowledge should the mediator
possess before he or she intervenes ? Does having a
specialization in the subject, for instance, make the
mediator partisan ? Lastly, what forms of technical
assistance can a mediator sponsor that are likely to help
lay disputants understand complex environmental issues ?
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